On Sunday 16 November, for about nineteen hours, visitors to 178 organisations received malware when they opened websites they had every reason to trust: CNN, the BBC, Zoom, HSBC, Salesforce, IKEA, and in Canada Equifax Canada, CTV News, Crave, TSN and Starbucks Canada. None of these organisations was hacked in the usual sense. The code came from a vendor they had invited onto their own pages.
Our position: a third-party script running on your website is a vendor with privileged access to your customers, and it should be treated as one: inventoried, constrained, monitored. It is a position, not a certainty: most of these tools never cause trouble, and the investigation has not yet said how the attacker got in. But the mechanism is clear enough to act on.
What happened
- The entry point. Optimizely Web lets customers add their own JavaScript, run on every page of a project. The attacker wrote a loader into that field across hundreds of customers. The rest of the file was untouched, served from Optimizely's content delivery network, with its certificate. To the browser, nothing set the poisoned code apart. Status: reported by the researchers at Report URI, who published the detailed analysis.
- The scale. Report URI examined 1,611 Optimizely files and found 188 infected, tied to 178 organisations; the real number is probably higher. Optimizely's own sites, its login page included, carried the code too. Status: reported by the researchers.
- The payload. A multi-purpose kit: swapping cryptocurrency wallet addresses, capturing card numbers typed into forms (payment pages hosted by Stripe or Adyen were out of reach), stealing accessible cookies and a screenshot of the page, and on iPhone and iPad, loading exploit kits aimed at unpatched iOS versions. Status: reported by the researchers; cryptocurrency was indeed stolen.
- The response. Optimizely acknowledged the incident on its status page. According to Report URI, every monitored file was clean by 23:11 UTC on 16 November. According to several outlets, Optimizely says it fixed the flaw, revoked tokens and reset affected accounts, and Mandiant is investigating. Status: confirmed by Optimizely for the incident; measures reported.
- The open question. Nobody yet knows how the attacker gained write access to so many unrelated customer projects: a compromised Optimizely system, a credential with cross-customer access, or something else. Status: not established.
What it changes
An Optimizely customer did nothing wrong. It picked a recognised tool, integrated it the way the vendor recommends, and its visitors were exposed anyway. That is third-party risk in one sentence: you inherit the security of every vendor that touches your production, including the one marketing added to test the colour of a button.
Three lessons for an executive team.
- These scripts are rarely in the vendor register. Marketing or digital teams buy them, on a credit card or a subscription, and they do not always go through third-party assessment. Yet a script running on your pages sees what your customers type.
- Browser trust is not a control. The poisoned code came from the right domain, with the right certificate. Only a content security policy (CSP) limiting where scripts can send data could have blocked the exfiltration, and only if it was strict.
- Your accountability does not stop at the vendor. If cards were captured on your site, your customers and your brand carry it, and in Quebec, the question of a reportable confidentiality incident falls on you, not on the vendor.
The same week, a cyberattack that wasn't
Between 12 and 17 November, the United States went through outage after outage: an FAA ground stop on the 13th, a Microsoft 365 outage from the 12th to the 14th, an incident at Chase, the NSA's internal network. Social media spoke of a coordinated cyberattack. According to the authorities and the companies, there was none: Microsoft points to a software defect in its network gateways, the FAA to a router installation on its telecom network, Chase to a bug, and the National Cyber Director ruled out a coordinated attack. Status: reported by several outlets; causes still preliminary.
What it changes: an outage and an attack look alike for the first hour, and that is exactly the hour in which an executive team must decide what to say, what to shut down and whom to call. A company that depends on a single provider for its email, payments or operations suffers the outage as an attack, whatever the cause. The question is not "who is attacking us?" but "whom do we depend on, and what do we do without them?".
What an executive team should check this week
- The inventory. Which third-party scripts run on our websites and payment pages: analytics, A/B testing, chat, advertising? Who added them, and are they in the vendor register?
- Optimizely specifically. If we use it: has the project's custom code been checked (search for
1688360.cc,atob(and any unknown script), and have users and access tokens been reviewed and rotated? - The technical boundary. Do we have a strict content security policy on pages where people type a card number or a password, and do our payments go through a page hosted by the provider?
- The first hour. If our email or payment provider goes down tomorrow, who decides within an hour whether it is an outage or an attack, and who speaks?
What do you think?
Our position: a third-party script is a vendor, not a line of code. Does your vendor register include the tools marketing plugs into your website? Tell us in the comments who, in your organisation, can add a script to production.
The FortaRisks Suppliers module keeps a record for every third party, digital tools included, and monitors your vendors with a first alert within 48 hours; the Exposure module shows what answers from the internet on your side. Our free vendor security questionnaire asks the vendor the right questions, and thirty minutes with an expert is enough to review your third-party scripts.
Sources: Report URI, analysis of the injection via Optimizely (16 Nov. 2026, updated 17 Nov.) · Optimizely, incident status page. Monitoring, named in the text: Malwarebytes, The Register, Dark Reading, US News, Le Grand Continent.