Your Sunday briefing · Risk series
Last Sunday, your vendors entered the register. If you ran the test, the same name probably appears on three, four, sometimes six lines. The IT provider is a way in for ransomware, a dependency for production, the holder of your backups. The hosting provider carries the ERP, the online store and email. Each line is rated "medium". The leadership team sees a row of yellow dots and moves on.
Our position: when several scenarios hang on the same vendor, they are no longer several small risks. They are one big one, and it deserves its own line. The trade calls it concentration risk, which we described in our article on the vendors you cannot lose. This episode brings it into the register. It is a position, not a scoring rule: sometimes, separate lines are enough.
Why the register hides concentration
A register assesses line by line. That is its strength, and it is what makes concentration invisible, for three reasons.
- Impact is sliced. Each line measures the loss of one process. None measures the day the vendor goes down and takes all four processes with it at once. Yet that is the day that stops the business.
- Owners are scattered. The head of operations accepts the "production" line, the CFO accepts the "payroll" line, IT accepts the "remote access" line. Each accepts a piece. Nobody has accepted the whole.
- The heat map misleads. Four yellow dots do not make a red one on a chart. They make one in reality.
What it changes: the question to ask your register is not only "what is our biggest risk?", but "which name comes up most often?".
What the frameworks say, and what July 2024 showed
OSFI Guideline B-10, which applies to federally regulated financial institutions, gives the most useful definition: institution-specific concentration risk is "the risk of loss or harm to the [institution] resulting from overreliance on a single third party, subcontractor or geography for multiple activities." It asks institutions to assess it before contracting and on an ongoing basis, over multiple dimensions including geography, supplier and subcontractor, and to understand systemic concentration, the kind an institution shares with others, to the greatest extent possible. Status: guidance published by the regulator.
The NIST Cybersecurity Framework 2.0 does not spell out concentration, but it lays the bricks: suppliers are known and prioritized by criticality (GV.SC-04), and threats, vulnerabilities, likelihoods and impacts are used to understand inherent risk and inform risk response prioritization (ID.RA-05). In December 2023, the Financial Stability Board published a third-party risk toolkit that explicitly aims at identifying, monitoring and managing systemic third-party dependencies. Status: official publications.
The clearest example is not a cyberattack. On July 19, 2024, a content update to CrowdStrike's Falcon software caused a global IT outage. CISA, the US cybersecurity agency, relayed CrowdStrike's confirmation: the outage was due to that update, not to malicious cyber activity. Microsoft estimated that 8.5 million Windows devices were affected, less than one percent of all Windows machines, and wrote that the broad economic impact reflected the use of CrowdStrike by enterprises that run many critical services. Status: confirmed by the companies and CISA. Less than one percent of machines, but concentrated where everything ran: airports, banks, hospitals, as the press reported.
What it changes: for an affected company, this was not a "workstation" incident, a "point of sale" incident and a "booking" incident. It was one event, one vendor chosen for good reasons, and it was a security tool. In Canada, the Canadian Centre for Cyber Security's National Cyber Threat Assessment 2025-2026 lists vendor concentration among its trends: an incident at a single dominant provider can affect an entire sector.
The method: from several lines to one
1. Sort the register by third party. Add a "third party involved" column if it does not exist, and fill it with last Sunday's names. Add the second-level dependencies you know as well: the hosting provider behind three of your vendors counts as a name.
2. Spot the concentrations. Our starting rule, to adjust: a third party that appears in three or more scenarios, or touches two or more essential processes, is a concentration. Below that, separate lines are enough.
3. Write the concentration scenario. Same four-part sentence as in the first episode: "Our hosting provider becomes unavailable for five days (source and event); the ERP, the store and email go down together (what is affected); we can neither produce, nor sell, nor notify our customers (consequence)." Its likelihood is that of the vendor failing, not that of each process. Its impact is the sum, not the maximum.
4. Give it an owner above the processes. Since the risk crosses several departments, the person who accepts it must cover them all: the CEO or the COO, never one of the owners of the original lines.
5. Keep the original lines, linked. The concentration scenario does not replace them: each keeps its treatment. It adds the ones no single line justified: a shared degraded mode, a second supplier, an exit plan, and the vendor's place in your crisis exercises, as NIST CSF provides (GV.SC-08).
The three traps
Averaging the ratings. Four "medium" risks do not make a medium risk. Never score the concentration from the average of its lines.
The name you cannot see. The most dangerous concentration often sits one level down: the same data center or the same software behind several of your vendors. B-10 makes the point by listing the subcontractor among the dimensions to assess.
"Everyone uses it." This is the argument that gets concentration accepted without a decision. On the day of the outage, the fact that your whole sector is hit does not reduce your loss; it often delays your recovery.
This week's test: thirty minutes, one sort
Bring together the person who keeps the register and a member of the leadership team.
- Sort the register by third party involved and count the lines for each name.
- For the three most frequent names, ask: what happens if this vendor is down for five days, all scenarios at once?
- Write the answer as a four-part sentence, and name the executive who accepts it.
Three results should worry you. A name on four lines or more, all rated "medium": the concentration is there, invisible. No executive able to accept the total: the risk has no owner its size. No shared degraded mode: each department will improvise its own, on the same day.
What you should have next Sunday
The same register, with a filled "third party involved" column and one to three concentration scenarios written out in full. Each links its original lines and carries a cumulative impact, an executive who covers every process affected, and at least one treatment the single lines did not justify. Your heat map may gain a red dot. That is good news: it was already there.
Where FortaRisks fits
The register lives in Forta Cockpit, the decision-makers' view. Signals from Forta Suppliers, which cross-checks each vendor's questionnaire against an external scan of its attack surface with a first alert within 48 hours, flow into the scenarios that name that vendor. A vendor that deteriorates moves all of its lines at once. To start without a tool, the TPRM readiness assessment places your program in a few minutes.
Next Sunday, November 22: controls that hold. A register says what can happen. It must also say what really protects you from it, and how you know.
Sources: OSFI, Guideline B-10, Third-Party Risk Management · NIST, Cybersecurity Framework 2.0 (CSWP 29, February 26, 2024) · Financial Stability Board, Enhancing Third-Party Risk Management and Oversight (December 4, 2023) · CISA, Widespread IT Outage Due to CrowdStrike Update (July 19, 2024) · Microsoft, Helping our customers through the CrowdStrike outage (July 20, 2024) · Canadian Centre for Cyber Security, National Cyber Threat Assessment 2025-2026