Every time an executive team chooses a cloud provider, the same question eventually comes up: "What about the CLOUD Act?" The answer heard most often fits in three words: "hosted in Canada". It is reassuring, and it is incomplete.
Our position: data sovereignty is a question of control and jurisdiction, not of address. What matters is the law that the company controlling your data must obey, not the country where the disk spins. But it is a risk to weigh, not a reason to panic: for most of your data, the CLOUD Act is not the most likely scenario. For some of it, it deserves a written decision.
What the text says
The CLOUD Act (Clarifying Lawful Overseas Use of Data Act) was passed by the US Congress in March 2018. It grew out of a specific dispute: Microsoft refused to hand US prosecutors emails stored in a data centre in Ireland, and the case was before the Supreme Court. Congress settled it before the judges did, and the Court declared the case moot in April 2018 (status: confirmed, US Supreme Court, United States v. Microsoft Corp.).
The heart of the law fits in one sentence. A provider of electronic communication or remote computing services must preserve and disclose data in its possession, custody or control, whether the data is located inside or outside the United States (status: confirmed, section 2713 of title 18 of the US Code). The test is not where the server sits. It is control exercised by a company subject to US jurisdiction.
What the law is not. The CLOUD Act covers criminal investigations, under a warrant or court order. It is not an open right of access to foreign companies' data, and it is not the only law in play: the Government of Canada also cites the US Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), a separate regime, and notes that under some foreign laws disclosure can happen without notice to the customer (status: confirmed, Government of Canada white paper on data sovereignty and the public cloud).
The remedies, and why they matter less for Canada
The law includes a safety valve. A provider may ask the court to quash or modify an order if the customer targeted is not a US person, does not reside in the United States, and disclosure would create a material risk of violating the laws of a "qualifying foreign government" (status: confirmed, section 2703(h) of title 18).
The detail that changes everything: a qualifying foreign government is a country that has an executive agreement with the United States in force. Today, the US Department of Justice lists two signed agreements: with the United Kingdom (signed 3 October 2019) and with Australia (signed 15 December 2021). For Canada, the official page shows only an announcement that negotiations opened, dated 22 March 2022 (status: confirmed, US Department of Justice). According to the Balsillie School of International Affairs and Lawfare, no agreement had been concluded in 2026 (status: reported).
The practical consequence: a US provider served with an order targeting a Canadian company's data does not have the statutory remedy for a conflict with Canadian law. It keeps the general comity defences, which are less certain. And the large providers publish transparency reports that show such requests exist, without letting you predict yours.
"Hosted in Canada" does not settle it
If your provider is the Canadian subsidiary of a US company, or is controlled by one, it may be required to answer a US order for data stored in Montreal or Toronto. The Government of Canada says so itself: data residency does not protect against the application of foreign laws, and as long as a provider established in Canada is subject to another country's law, Canada does not have full sovereignty over its data (status: confirmed, white paper).
The most quoted admission came from France. On 10 June 2025, under oath before a French Senate inquiry committee, Microsoft France's director of public and legal affairs was asked to guarantee that French citizens' data would never be handed to US authorities without the French authorities' consent. His answer: "No, I cannot guarantee it", adding that it had never happened so far (status: confirmed, Senate record). Both halves of the sentence matter: the risk is legal and real, and it has not materialised at scale.
What Law 25 already asks of you
In Quebec, this is not only geopolitics. Section 17 of the Act respecting the protection of personal information in the private sector, as amended by Law 25, requires a privacy impact assessment before communicating personal information outside Quebec, or entrusting a person outside Quebec with collecting, using, communicating or keeping it on your behalf (status: confirmed, text of the Act). The assessment considers the sensitivity of the information, the purpose, the protection measures, including contractual ones, and the legal framework applicable in the State where it will be communicated. The communication may proceed only if the assessment concludes that the information would receive adequate protection, and a written agreement must take it into account.
Two consequences. First, "in Canada" is not "in Quebec": hosting in Ontario is still a communication outside Quebec. Second, exposure to a foreign law such as the CLOUD Act is part of the legal framework to assess. Quebec's Commission d'accès à l'information publishes a guide to conducting this assessment; it is the right place to start.
Federally, the Office of the Privacy Commissioner reminds organisations that they remain accountable for information entrusted to a third party, and that processing abroad exposes it to that country's laws (status: confirmed). It does not prohibit it: it asks you to know and to inform individuals.
The method: five steps to decide
1. Classify data by sensitivity. Not all your data carries the same risk. Public marketing data and health records, trade secrets or defence information do not call for the same answer. Three levels are enough to start: public, internal, sensitive.
2. Identify who controls each provider. For providers handling sensitive data, the question is not "where are the servers?", it is "which company controls the service, and which law is it subject to?". Go up to the parent company. Do the same for their subcontractors: backups, support, logs, AI model provider.
3. Encrypt with keys you hold. Encryption with customer-managed keys, ideally outside the provider's infrastructure, is the technical measure that reduces the risk most: a provider can only hand over in clear what it can decrypt. It has an operating cost, and it does not suit every service. Keep it for sensitive data.
4. Write the commitments into the contract. Four clauses make the difference: notice to the customer of any request from a foreign authority, to the extent the law allows; a commitment to challenge an overbroad request; publication of a transparency report; and advance notice before any change of region, subcontractor or country of access.
5. Prepare the exit. A tested exit plan (data export in a usable format, deletion deadline, an identified alternative) turns a dependency into a choice. It is also what the section 17 assessment and your most demanding customers will eventually ask for.
What we are not saying
We are not saying you should leave the large US providers: for many uses, their security, resilience and offering remain superior, and the CLOUD Act risk is small compared to everyday threats. Nor are we saying a Canadian provider settles everything: it may have US subcontractors, and sovereignty is checked provider by provider. We are saying an executive team should be able to answer one simple question in writing: for our sensitive data, which foreign law could give access to it, and have we accepted that knowingly?
What do you think?
Is data sovereignty a real selection criterion at your company, or a box ticked in the tender? Have you ever asked a provider which law its parent company is subject to? Tell us in the comments.
FortaRisks is a Quebec company, and our data is hosted in Canada. The five steps apply to us too. Thirty minutes with an expert is enough to classify your three most exposed providers.
Sources: US Code, title 18, section 2713 (disclosure of data located outside the United States) · US Code, title 18, section 2703 (provider remedies) · US Department of Justice, CLOUD Act resources and agreements · US Department of Justice, negotiations opened with Canada (22 March 2022) · Government of Canada, white paper on data sovereignty and the public cloud · Act respecting the protection of personal information in the private sector (CQLR, c. P-39.1), section 17 · CAI, guide to privacy impact assessments (French) · Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, guidelines for processing personal data across borders · French Senate, public procurement inquiry committee, hearing of Microsoft France, 10 June 2025. Monitoring, named in the text: Balsillie School of International Affairs, Lawfare.